Discussions of The Revision Theory of Truth

Book Symposium (Philosophical Issues 8, 1997)

  • Vann McGee -- Revision (link)
  • Donald A. Martin -- Revision and its Rivals (link)
  • Anil Gupta -- Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin (link)

Book Symposium (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35, 1994)

  • Robert Koons -- Review of the Revision Theory of Truth (free access)
  • Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap -- Reply to Robert Koons (free access)

Selected Discussions of the Revision Theory

  • A. Antonelli, "Non-Well-Founded Sets via Revision Rules," Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), 633-679. (link)
  • A. Antonelli, "The Complexity of Revision," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1994), 67-72. (free access)
  • A. Antonelli, "The Complexity of Revision, Revised," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2002), 75-78. (free access)
  • C. M. Asmus, "Vagueness and Revision Sequences," Synthese 190 (2013), 953-974. (link)
  • N. Belnap, "Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 103-116. (link)
  • N. Belnap, "On Rigorous Definitions," Philosophical Studies 72 (1993), 115-146. (link)
  • R. Bruni, "Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision," Studia Logica 101 (2013), 915-932. (link)
  • J. P. Burgess, "The Truth is Never Simple," Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1986), 663-681. (link)
  • A. Cantini, "Paradoxes, Self-Reference and Truth in the 20th Century," in J. D. Gabbay (ed.) Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 5, pp. 875-1013,
    Elsevier, 2009.
  • A. Chapuis, "Alternative Revision Theories of Truth," Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1996), 399-423. (link)
  • Hans Herzberger, "Notes on Naive Semantics," Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 61-102. (link)
  • P. Kremer, "The Gupta-Belnap systems S* and S# are not axiomatisable", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1993), 583-596. (free access)
  • P. Kremer, "The Revision Theory of Truth," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (free access)
  • P. Kremer, "How Truth Behaves When There's No Vicious Reference,"  Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2010), 345-367. (link)
  • K Kühnberger, Formal Frameworks for Circular Phenomena, Doctoral Dissertation, Univ. of Tubingen.
  • K Kühnberger et al., "Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions," Studia Logica 81 (2005), 79-98. (link)
  • B. Lee, "The Paradox of Belief Instability and the Revision Theory of Belief," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2003), 314-328. (link)
  • B. Löwe, "Revision Sequences and Computers with Infinite Amount of Time," Journal of Logic and Computation 2001 11(1):25-40. (free access) (link)
  • B. Löwe & P.D. Welch, "Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth," Studia Logica 68 (2001), 21-41. (link)
  • M. Martinez, "Some Closure Properties of Finite Definitions," Studia Logica 68 (2001), 43-68. (link)
  • J. Martínez-Fernández, "Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (2007), 449-472. (free access)
  • V. McGee, Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
  • F. Orilia, "Meaning and Circular Definitions," Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2000), 155-169. (link)
  • F. Orilia, "Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions," Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2000), 212-246. (link)
  • L. Shapiro, "The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics," Philosophical Studies 129 (2006), 477-515. (link)
  • S. Standefer, "Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions," Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2015), 467-487.(link)
  • A. Visser, "Semantics and the Liar Paradox," in D. Gabbay, F. Guethner (eds.) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11, 2nd edn., pp. 149-240, Springer, 2004.
  • P. D. Welch, "On Revision Operators," Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2003), 689-711. (free access) (link)
  • P. D. Welch, "On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set," Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (2001), 345-360. (free access) (link)
  • S. Wintein, "Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference," Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2014), 665-690. (link)
  • A. M. Yaqub, The Liar Speaks the Truth: A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.